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Emanuela Todeva, University of Surrey 
 
Definition 
Behavioural theory of the firm (BTF) is a composition of a number of theories that have 
emerged within economics, sociology, business and management studies – to deal with the 
issues of how firms behave in a market place and what determines the inter-firm relationships.  
 
Conceptual overview 
The economic theory of the firm looks at the firm as a black box, as a unit processing inputs 
into outputs. The behavioural theory of the firm (BTF) attempt to compensate for this narrow 
view, and looks at what happens inside the firm, how the throughput takes place as economic 
activity, and how decisions are made regarding production, scheduling, and inventory. The 
BTF is known also as a decision theory, as it explains the circumstances of operational 
decisions, and the outcomes that contribute to value added. Decisions are interpreted as a 
sequential process which includes both rational and non-rational aspects, and are affected by 
ownership rights, liabilities, control over resources, and power. 
 
Other core concepts related to the BTF are the notion of firm’s competences and capabilities, 
organisational learning, accumulation of knowledge, cognition and motivation, or how firms 
learn about their internal and external environment. The BTF advocates for the endogeneity of 
preferences and expectation as the main source of bounded rationality, or the ‘irrational’ 
choices made by firm’s managers in situations of uncertainty and complexity.  
 
The BTF is a complex agglomeration of business and management theories that contribute to 
our understanding of the firm. Since its inception, the BTF is dealing with the question of firm 
boundaries and the related questions of incentives within and outside these boundaries, or 
opportunities in the environment to capture value and to generate profits and rents. Ultimately 
the BTF explains strategic decision making beyond environmental incentives. It is also related 
to the foundations of the institutional and evolutionary theory of the firm and to various 
learning and innovation theories. 
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Critical commentary and future directions 
The nature and behaviour of firms have been elaborated in a large number of economic, 
strategy, and management theories that contribute to BTF. Economic theories treat firms as 
autonomous actors that are engaged in value creation activities, utilising various resource 
inputs and factors of production, where firm behaviour is induced by environmental incentives 
and constraints. The strategic management theory has recognised that behind each firm stands a 
management team, composed of professionals that are empowered to make decisions regarding 
strategic alternatives, regarding internal allocation of resources, or giving direction to firm’s 
activities. Strategic behaviour of the firm in this context is represented by the strategic choices 
of managers. Administration and management theories also have contributed to the debate on 
decision making, power relationships, and structure – or factors that induce firms’ behavioural 
responses. Sociological, anthropological and organisational behaviour theories have explored 
the behaviour of individuals, groups, institutions and other organised entities, as well as the 
development and interaction with technologies and socio-cultural artefacts.  
 
Different theories refer to different definitions of the firm. Whitley defines firms as centres of 
economic power that combine allocative decision making with authoritative coordination of 
economic activities and as such they add value to human and material resources through 
collective organisation of work. Firms are seen as dominant units of strategic decision making 
and planned coordination that combine differentiated skills, capabilities and knowledge, and 
embody a collective organisation which transforms human and material resources into 
productive services. Attributes of these economic actors are: governance structure; separation 
of ownership from control, and delegation of control; goals and objectives realised within 
particular profit constraints; diversity of activities and capabilities which are coordinated 
through authoritative communication; and radical discontinuities in the carried out activities 
and capabilities. 
 
Mark Casson gives another original definition of the firm – as an institution that specialises in 
coordination of business functions using a single locus of responsibility as a legal entity, and a 
structure designed to harmonise the decision making efforts of a group of people. The 
attributes of the firm in Casson’s framework can be described as specific roles and functions 
and include the following: the firm as producer (transforming inputs into outputs); as organiser 
(making price and production decisions in the context of permanent market volatility); as 
employer (contracting resources, engaged in and designing the division of labour); as 
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intermediator (possessing simultaneously special knowledge of valuations of goods and market 
information on possibilities for the market relocation of these goods for alternative use); as 
risk-taking vs. risk-aversive decision maker; as user of information (capable of acquiring trade-
related information as the basis for long-run comparative advantage); and as evaluator (capable 
of evaluation of resources and self-evaluation of competencies). 
 
Organisation theories also have left a footprint in the definitional maze, conceptualising firms 
as organised collectivities - goal-directed, resource dependent, boundary maintaining, and 
socially constructed system of human activity, comprising of deliberate design, status 
structures, orientation towards an environment, with shared understanding among 
participants, and substitutability of personnel who is entitled to various organisational 
benefits.  
 
As goal directed, firms generate preferences and choices for their members, and are vulnerable 
to be controlled by owners and leaders through the preferences of these leaders. As resource 
dependent, organisations seek, acquire, and accumulate tangible and intangible resources, 
capabilities and competences that enable them to accomplish the work. As boundary-
maintaining, organisations enlist membership and draw a distinction between members and 
non-members. Organisations also develop membership rules and procedures to coordinate and 
manage the membership status of actors. As an activity system, each organisation consists of 
interdependent role behaviours, set of routines, and a bundle or multiple sequences of activities 
accomplishing the work. The activity system is represented by what organisations do and what 
organisational members enact in the process of participating. Overall social scientists would 
agree that firms are simultaneously a bundle of contracts, a bundle of resources, and a bundle 
of knowledge and information.  
 
Among the leading economic theories that have contributed to our understanding of firm 
behaviour are: transaction cost economics, non-cooperative game theory, agency theory, and 
contract theory. The two building blocks for the economists have been ‘incentives’ and ‘costs’, 
and hence the development of theories that explain sources of incentives (property rights, 
governance theories, and agency theories), and sources of costs (contract theory, transaction 
cost economics, and various shareholder theories of cooperation). 
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Transaction-cost theory has developed the argument that firm behaviour is driven by rational 
choices based on cost calculations. Scientists using transaction cost economics usually study 
strategic responses by firms that lead to specialisation and diversification, or decisions related 
to cost control and activities within the boundaries of the firm. 
 
The non-co-operative game theory is a representative of the ‘incentives’ school in economics 
and analyses the underlying motives of strategic behaviour in a competitive environment under 
the conditions of limited access to information. According to the leading theorists in this field, 
the market players aim to maximise their payoffs in a wider sense, rather than maximising 
profits. The market behaviour of each actor is determined by the market structure that provides 
different incentives for actors. Usually alternative strategic choices utilised by players are to 
cooperate or to compete. The behavioural adjustments that players make in the process of 
interaction are according to their expectations, observations of others’ motives, and rational 
calculations of their own self-interest.  
 
Agency theory brings more insights into the formal and informal contracts that facilitate 
exchanges between firms and the bargaining and negotiation of these contracts. The agency 
theory of the firm, looks at the company as governed by a set of contractual relationships, or a 
bundle of contracts. The firm is only a legal entity, an agent engaged in bi-lateral and multi-
lateral contracts. The agency theory does not look at the contracts themselves, but what 
decision-making power they constitute and what relationships they represent. Each contract is 
conceptualised as a formal agreement between a principle (delegating power), and an agent 
(exercising this power and making decisions on behalf of the principle). 
 
The theory also reveals the political nature of firms, involved in continuous negotiations of 
contracts. The bargaining and political nature of these contracts suggests that the relationships 
behind these contracts are a balance of competition and co-operation between actors, and 
behaviour is induced by a set of motives and incentives, embedded in agreed contracts. 
 
The contract theory is related to the ‘new institutional economics’ and has adopted a critical 
stand to assumptions about contracts. All contracts are inherently dependent on the institutional 
form of intermediation that exists for contract enforcement, on the ability of contracting agents 
to acquire and synthesise all relevant information, and on the environmental volatility.  
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In addition to formal contracts there are relational contracts that rely on a range of diverse 
coordination mechanisms such as ‘reciprocity norms’, ‘inter-organizational trust’, and ‘social 
capital’ - embedded in multiplex of exchanges and social interactions.  As a theoretical 
perspective, the scientific assumptions of mutuality and agreement that implicitly underlay 
relational contracting contrasts with the opportunism which is explicitly presumed in both 
agency theory and transaction cost economics. 
 
Relational contracting embraces not only unspecifiable terms and conditions in complex and 
open-ended contracts, but also collective inter-organizational strategies employing tacit 
coordination. Pursuing a collective strategy typically depends on unanticipated future 
conditions that cannot be explicitly written into formal contractual agreements between 
business partners. Hence, successful strategies require basic trust, mutual understanding, 
unrestricted learning, and inter-organizational knowledge-sharing to achieve a high level of 
joint decision making at both strategic and operational levels.  Doz, Olk and Ring have 
operationalised these processes as ‘open solicitation’ and ‘seeking domain consensus’, where 
the relational partners continually elaborate on their mutual objectives, capabilities, resources, 
and tasks.  Achieving a consensus would then serve as a foundation on which relationally 
contracted firms could subsequently announce and implement formal contracts. A central issue 
in relational contracting remains how best to manage the balance between interdependence and 
control.  
 
Managerial theory of the firm (MTF) is related to both agency theory and contract theory. It 
had also accommodated contributions from institutional theory, contingency theory, population 
ecology, and strategic management theory, and particularly the resource-based view and the 
knowledge-based view of the firm. In its entire complexity it puts emphasis on the variety of 
competencies, specialised resources and assets that each firm has in principle and the tendency 
of the firm on one hand to match its structure and processes to the changes in the environment, 
and on the other - to develop a unique character in order to acquire strategic competitive 
advantage.  
 
The foundations of the MTF are built on the recognition that the separation of ownership from 
control transfers the control power from the owners to the managers. This separation gives 
power to managers who do not carry liabilities, and as consequence gives rise to the 
bureaucratic power that emerge in the efforts to manage organisational resources.  
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Much of the development of the MTF is based on the fundamental assumption by Cyert and 
March of the maximising behaviour of actors, where participants receive inducements from the 
organisation in return for their contributions and they aim to maximise these inducements. This 
assumption is extended in the literature with the argument that decision making in 
organisations is rational and goal oriented. Hence, managerial decisions are aiming at 
maximising both personal and organisational outcomes. 
 
Goals are derived at in the process of bargaining between individual participants within the 
firm. In this process of bargaining and negotiations of goals participants develop expectations 
regarding the behaviour of the others, and may adjust their own goals according to the 
expectations of others. The goal adaptation process frames different strategic opportunities and 
modifies alternative organisational choices of actors within firms. Organisational choices are 
defined as outcomes from the goal adaptation and the decision-making process. On these 
grounds some authors reject the assumption of the profit-maximisation of the firm as an overall 
orientation in the market place, and suggest that decision-making and negotiations lead to 
optimising behaviour.  
 
Overall, the MTF has produced a number of conceptual frameworks that explain the use of 
power to control the behaviour of other actors, and the use of various relationships and 
manipulative techniques to counteract uncertainties and opposition, or to coordinate the 
activities and behaviour of others. Among the tools and means to control the behaviour of 
actors that are explored, are the use of incentives, power and coalitions. The coalitions (or 
cliques) built by managers usually aim to ensure that all participants share similar objectives 
and are willing to compromise and to give support to each other in everyday decision making. 
Overall the managerial theory of the firm treats in equal way the behaviour of the firm and the 
strategic choices of the managers - even though the later is a means of the former.  
 
Other established organisation and management theories that have advanced our knowledge 
are: resource dependence theory; knowledge-based view; contingency theory; population-
ecology; institutional theory. The main building blocks in management science have been: 
resources and capabilities, environmental factors, and strategic response. 
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According to the resource-based view, the accumulation of heterogeneous resources is a 
selective and strategic process that originates with a managerial vision as a significant driving 
force. It is difficult to establish the causality between accumulated resources and assets by a 
firm and specific strategic decisions - both are simultaneously constraints and opportunities for 
each other. Academic writers emphasise that firm’s opportunity set is unique which follows 
from the unique bundle of resources possessed by each firm. Strategic decisions lead to both 
accumulation of unique resources and designing unique trajectories for firm’s growth and 
development. 
 
Strategic decisions with resource implications include those of asset ownership, the use of 
technologies, the structuring of activities, the scope of internalisation, diversification of 
products, or new market entry – amongst others.  
 
The knowledge-based view of the firm looks at firms as acting bundles of knowledge and skills 
embedded in organisational routines and practices. The knowledge is not treated merely as a 
resource, but as an essential element of the learning process that takes part in parallel with the 
work process. This learning framework challenges all established economic theories suggesting 
that the value of assets changes in congruence with the voluntary contributions by learning 
agents that chose to produce added value above the contracted one. It is acknowledged also that 
learning takes place across the boundaries of the firm, which makes the value added process in 
firms subject to relationships and information flows beyond the control of the management. 
Informal or incomplete contracts are suggested to give learning advantages to actors, allowing 
them to extend their capacity and capabilities during the process of carrying out the contracted 
activity, and hence generating extended value for their input.  
 
Firms’ abilities to learn are also referred to as dynamic capabilities, allowing these agents to 
gain comparative advantage. Essential pre-condition for learning is a shared context of 
language and culture that allows actors to communicate, interact, exchange information and 
relate to each other, strengthening further the initial framework of shared understanding. 
 
Contingency theory is one of the predecessors of the knowledge-based view and has argued 
about the same dynamic adaptation between an organisation and its environment. Changes both 
in the internal and the external environment generate adaptive responses with subsequent re-
location of resources and learning. 
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The development of evolutionary theory has focused on the fundamental processes of 
variation, selection and retention in populations of firms. These processes emerge as a result of 
the cumulative effect from behavioural choices of all firms in a population. The variation 
principle suggests that firms vary in the routines they have developed to conduct their business. 
As these routines capture tacit knowledge and endogenous learning, they capture unique 
bundles of firm-specific resources and capabilities. The second principle of selection refers to 
some behavioural choices and routines being revealed to be more effective then others, and 
therefore becoming dominant over time through natural selection by the market. The principle 
of selection by the market assumes that certain routines lead to improved market performance. 
The retention principle refers to firm’s capabilities to manage their bundle of resources and 
practices while competing with other firms. Retention hence means not absolute superior 
knowledge, capabilities, and behavioural choices, but relative advantage of these. 
 
Overall the evolutionary theory in sociology and economics brings a Darwinian perspective to 
the analysis of firm behaviour, and puts emphasis on the dynamic aspects of this behaviour 
through change, adaptation, development and growth over time. It puts the environment as an 
endogenous factor that justifies the variation in organisational forms and in governance types. 
The theory also substantiates the argument for heterogeneity in actors’ forms and attributes. 
As a theory, it offers explanations of the boundaries of organisations and populations which 
demarcate an entity from its environment. It also offers theoretical explanation for behavioural 
choices that lead to firm’s mimicry, inertia, and survival.  
 
The institutional theory is primarily concerned with the relationship or the fit between 
organizations and their institutional environment, and the normative context of this 
environment encapsulated in cultural, institutional and social conventions. Behaviour is 
analysed from the perspective of the effects of social expectations (norms) on the actors, and 
the extent to which actors comply with these norms, and conform with the established rules 
and institutional practices.  
 
Theorists put emphasis on the coercive, mimetic, or normative isomorphism among business 
organisations. The sources of this isomorphism are various environmental pressures. Examples 
of behaviour that results from environmental pressures are when firms react to stakeholder’s 
expectations in an attempt to carry social responsibilities, or when firms copy each-other and 
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produce the so-called ‘band-wagon’ effect where multiple firms make similar choices and 
follow market leaders. Often these behavioural responses aim to enhance the legitimation of a 
firm. 
 
The BTF represents a diverse pool of theorising about behaviour in economic context. In its 
entire complexity it does not offer significant chances for integration, but the efforts in this 
direction continue. 
 
Cross-references: Agency, Complexity of decision making, contingency theory, evolutionary 
theory, game theory, institutional theory, principle-agent theory, rational choice theory, 
transaction cost theory 
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